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GOD v. WAL-MART; The Battle Over the
"Better Use" of Land: Has the Supreme
Court Allowed for Economic Development
at the Cost of Invaluable Religious Rights?
Robin M. Davis*
I. Introduction
For the past forty-seven years you have gone to the same church'
every Sunday. It has become a part of you. You were married in this
church twenty-five years ago. Your children were baptized there, and it
is where you attend weekly services with friends and family. As you
arrive this week, no different than any other week, you find shocking
news. The doors are locked and a sign reads, "CHURCH
CONDEMNED. WAL-MART SUPERCENTER STORE COMING
SOON! "
You are disgusted. This institution was your sanctuary for religious
worship for nearly fifty years. You have participated in mission
assignments, held community fairs, hosted vacation bible schools, and
played in the softball league. Now suddenly, the church is no more.
Surprised parishioners gather around the sign with you. The pastor
explains that the church property was seized through eminent domain
and there is nothing he can do. Apparently, the church was condemned
by the local borough council and subsequently transferred to a private
corporation for economic development. The pastor promises to work
quickly towards securing a new site, but cannot make any promises
regarding future locations or when the church will reopen.
You are devastated, but also furious. You do not understand. Since
J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2007; B.A. Political Science, cum laude, The College of New Jersey, 2004.
1. Church property owned by a religious organization is used solely as an example
for purposes of this argument; please note that the author respects all religious
denominations and acknowledges that this problem could occur to any tract of land
owned and used by any religious organization.
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when can the government seize land to build a Wal-Mart? You feel as
though the local borough council has violated your First Amendment
right to religious freedom via state eminent domain laws. Can Wal-Mart,
or any other "big-box" retailer, now violate your constitutional
freedoms?
On June 23, 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided Kelo v.
City of New London2 and dramatically expanded the concept of "public
use" as defined by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.3 In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor brought this
issue to light and criticized the majority for jeopardizing citizens'
constitutionally-protected religious rights.4
Justice O'Connor remarked that "[u]nder the banner of economic
development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and
transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded-
i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems
more beneficial to the public ... , This result begs the question: what
is the better "public use" of land? This inquiry becomes increasingly
difficult when the land is owned by a religious organization, used by the
public for religious worship, and the consequential taking would
transform the land into private, economically developed property, such
as a retail store.
The purpose of this Comment is to highlight the constitutional
vulnerabilities that Kelo v. City of New London has produced. Part II of
this Comment will explain the Kelo decision and how it jeopardizes the
First Amendment right to freedom of religion. Part III-A discusses the
constitutional tug-of-war between the First and Fifth Amendments that
will occur as a result of Kelo. Part III-B demonstrates how states
interpret the concept of "best public use." Part III-C focuses on the
problems states incur when economic agendas are involved in eminent
domain proceedings.
Next, Part III-D explains the abuses that have arisen from the
Supreme Court's recent decisions defining "public use." Part III-E
describes how states currently take either a conservative or liberal
2. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (5-4 decision holding that a
city's exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of an economic redevelopment
plan satisfied the constitutional requirement of "public use").
3. See id. at 2668.
4. See id. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting):
While the government may take their homes to build a road or a railroad or to
eliminate a property use that harms the public, say petitioners, it cannot take
their property for the private use of other owners simply because the new
owners may make more productive use of the property.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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interpretation of the words "public use" regarding the condemnation of
land used by religious organizations. Finally, Part III-F sets the stage for
future discussions of what will come in a post-Kelo nation. This section
argues that in response to this decision, state legislatures must prevent
condemnation of religiously-used lands in order to preserve First
Amendment freedoms. Part IV concludes by proposing a beneficial and
realistic path that state legislatures should take to ensure that the
Constitution is upheld and that citizens' rights are protected.
II. Background
A. Defining "Public Use"
Traditionally, eminent domain referred to the government's ability
to take land from private parties and convert the land into a public use.
6
Through eminent domain powers conferred by the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, the Constitution specifically allows both federal and
state governments to take private property.7 The Takings Clause states,
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."8 To satisfy the Takings Clause, a taking must satisfy two
requirements. 9 The first is that land can only be taken for "public use"; 0
the second is that just compensation be paid for the land.l"
The Constitution only establishes the parameters for eminent
domain laws. State legislatures are given the responsibility of enacting
eminent domain laws and enumerating the state's specific powers and
scope.12 Although the legislative branch determines the discretion and
6. See J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Md.-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 792
A.2d 288, 297 (Md. 2002) ("[e]minent domain, in its simplest terms, is the 'inherent
power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property... and convert it to
public use .... ' (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (7th ed. 1999)).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is extended by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also, e.g., Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 228 (1897).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. The constitutional requirement of "just compensation" is not at issue for
purposes of this Comment. Of course, if religious land is constitutionally condemned
under the Takings Clause, a price must be paid for the land. The sole purpose of this
Comment, however, is to argue that seizures and transfers of religious land for private
economic development are unconstitutional.
12. See City of Tahlequah v. Lake Region Elec., Co-op, Inc., 47 P.3d 467, 471
(Okla. 2002) ("[tlhe power of condemnation lies dormant within the State until such time
as the Legislature by specific enactment delineates the manner and through whom it may
be exercised.").
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power vested in eminent domain laws,13 the judiciary is still the final
judge of whether the taking sufficiently satisfies the "public use"
requirement. 14
Currently, the Supreme Court identifies three categories of takings
that comply with the "public use" requirement." 5 The first category
allows the government to transfer private property to public ownership,
1 6
such as public roads, highways, and hospitals. 17 The second category
allows the government to transfer private property to private parties, who
then make the property available for the public's use.18  This second
category of transfers includes railroads, public utilities, and stadiums.19
Recently, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the terms "public
20ownership" and "use-by-the-public" are sometimes too constricting,
making it impractical21 to classify the scope of the Public Use Clause
into two categories.
Therefore, the Court created a third category which allows private
property to be seized by the government and then transferred for
another's private use. The Court intentionally interpreted the Takings
Clause to allow "that, in certain circumstances and to meet certain
exigencies, takings that serve a public purpose also satisfy the
Constitution even if the property is destined for subsequent private
use."
22
13. See Utilities, Inc. of Md. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 763 A.2d 129,
133-34 (Md. 2000).
14. See Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930) ("[i]t is well established
that.., the question [of] what is a public use is a judicial one.").
15. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
16. See id.
17. See id.; see, e.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55 (1925)
(military purposes); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923)
(highways).
18. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2655.
19. See id. See also, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503
U.S. 407 (1992) (railroads); Mt. Vemon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate
Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916) (public water power).
20. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2655.
21. Seeid.at2662:
Indeed, while many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed "use by the
public" as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily eroded
over time. Not only was the "use by the public" test difficult to administer
(e.g., what proportion of the public need to have access to the property? at what
price?), but it proved to be impractical given the diverse and always evolving
needs of society.
Id.
22. Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J. dissenting); see, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
28 (1954) (holding that the constitutional requirement under the Takings Clause "for
public use" authorizes aesthetic considerations as well as considerations of health); Haw.
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984) (extending Berman, holding that
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The Supreme Court adopted its interpretation of "public use" from
its broad holding in Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley.2 3 In
Fallbrook Irrigation, the Court held that a broader application of the
term "public use" as a "public purpose" should be implemented.24
However, the Kelo majority endorsed an even more expansive
interpretation of Fallbrook Irrigation's "public purpose.
25
B. Recent Developments-Kelo v. City of New London
In Kelo, the Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of
Connecticut's legislatively-imposed eminent domain power to take
private land for economic redevelopment. 26 Connecticut has an eminent
domain statute that authorizes the condemnation of private property for a
subsequent transfer to a private entity for economic redevelopment.2 7 In
New London, Connecticut, a pharmaceutical company offered to buy a
large tract of land from the city and redevelop it in order to stimulate the
local economy.2 s The land mostly belonged to a vacant military facility,
but the plan also involved the condemnation of several private
29properties.
Although the general area was categorized as a distressed
municipality30 in need of economic revitalization, the land in dispute in
condemnation of private property to weaken an oligopoly is a rational exercise of power
under the Fifth Amendment).
23. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2657; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112
(1896).
24. See Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 158, 160-64.
25. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2657.
26. Id. at 2658.
27. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005). See also CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-186 (2005):
It is found and declared that the economic welfare of the state depends upon the
continued growth of industry and business within the state; that the acquisition
and improvement of unified land and water areas and vacated commercial
plants to meet the needs of industry and business should be in accordance with
local, regional and state planning objectives; that such acquisition and
improvement often cannot be accomplished through the ordinary operations of
private enterprise at competitive rates of progress and economies of cost; that
permitting and assisting municipalities to acquire and improve unified land and
water areas and to acquire and improve or demolish vacated commercial plants
for industrial and business purposes and, in distressed municipalities, to lend
funds to businesses and industries within a project area in accordance with such
planning objectives are public uses and purposes for which public moneys may
be expended; and that the necessity in the public interest for the provisions of
this chapter is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.
Id. (emphasis added).
28. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2658.
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Kelo was well-maintained. It was not distressed or blighted.3' However,
the Court afforded Connecticut's statute extreme deference and affirmed
the Supreme Court of Connecticut's decision that it satisfied the "public
use" requirement because it was in the "public interest" to take the
private land for economic redevelopment. 2
Kelo effectively changed the disposition of land use by expanding
the definition of "public use."33  In Kelo, the majority held that the
economic redevelopment plan set forth by the city of New London
served a "public purpose, satisfying the "public use" requirement and
the Takings Clause challenges. 35 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held
that a city's exercise of eminent domain powers in furtherance of an
economic development plan 36 satisfied the "public use" requirement
under the Takings Clause of the Constitution.37
The Supreme Court left no guidance as to further restrictions on
states' discretion. The Court stated:
Just as we decline to second-guess the City's considered judgments
about the efficacy of its development plan, we. also decline to second-
guess the City's determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in
order to effectuate the project .... Once the question of public
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be
taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete
the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.
38
The majority emphasized that its job was to set the floor, not the ceiling,
31. Id. at 2660.
32. See id. (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 515-21 (Conn.
2004)).
33. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2671 (2005) (O'Connor, J.
dissenting).
34. See Review of Kelo v. New London Court Case on Eminent Domain: Capitol Hill
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce & the H. Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Michael
D. Ramsey, Professor at Law, San Diego Law School) [hereinafter Ramsey]. Ramsey
argues:
The Court did not pretend to base its conclusion upon the text and historical
understanding of the Constitution. Instead, it said that the evolving modern
needs of society required that it substitute the phrase "public purpose" for the
Constitution's phrase "public use"-so that the government could seize private
land at any time that seizure would facilitate "economic development." As
Justice O'Connor pointed out in her dissent, this effectively removes all
constitutional limits on the eminent domain power.
Id.
35. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
36. Id. ("[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted
function of government. There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing
economic development from other public purposes we have recognized.").
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2668 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954)).
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for eminent domain guidelines 39 and rejected Justice O'Connor's
dissenting opinion that land can be vulnerable. 40  The Court reiterated
that individual states possess their own authority to implement limits and
protections on the power of eminent domain and retain the ability to
place further restrictions on land seizure policies.41 These requirements
can be established by state constitutional law42 or in state eminent
domain statutes setting limits on which takings can occur.43
C. Kelo's Powerful Dissent
In one of her most powerful dissents, Justice O'Connor contended
that Kelo effectively deleted the words "public use" from the Takings
Clause and dramatically altered the text of the Constitution.44 She
argued:
To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits
resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render
economic development takings "for public use" is to wash out any
distinction between private and public use of property-and thereby
effectively to delete the words "for public use" from the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
45
As Justice O'Connor argued, no longer do the words "public use"
realistically exclude any type of taking, or exert any constraint on the
takings power.46 Justice O'Connor emphasized that the majority had
dramatically expanded the "public use" standard to include economic
concerns. 47 No longer is this term just for governmental necessity.
48
Now legislatures may deem an "economic upgrade" as sufficient to take
39. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).
40. See id. (noting that "nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.., many states already impose
'public use' requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline.").
41. See id.
42. Id.; see, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 773 (Mich. 2004).
43. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668. Under California law, for instance, a city may only
take land for economic development purposes in blighted areas (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 33030-37 (West 1997)). See, e.g., Redevelopment Agency of Chula Vista v.
Rados Bros., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 243 (Cal. 2002).
44. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
"abandon[ing] this long-held, basic limitation on government power.").
48. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice O'Connor, "[u]nder the
banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken
and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded-i.e., given to
an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the
public[.]").
20061
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land away as long as there is just compensation.49
Justice O'Connor's dissent exposes the potential for infringement of
First Amendment rights. Specifically, this danger lies with the
susceptibility of governmental takings on land that is used by religious
organizations for worship. In one simple and powerful line, Justice
O'Connor stated, "any church ... might be replaced with a retail
store." 5 ° Justice O'Connor foreshadowed the potential abuses that the
Kelo majority neglected to protect against.
Additionally, Justice O'Connor's dissent emphasized the historical
importance of the Takings Clause's two requirements: for public use and
just compensation. 5' These two requirements demonstrate not only the
importance of the protections established by the Framers of the
Constitution, but also the significance of the Constitution itself.
52
O'Connor continued by advocating that the two requirements of the
Takings Clause "ensure stable property ownership by providing
safeguards against excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the
government's eminent domain power-particularly against those owners
who, for whatever reasons, may be unable to protect themselves in the
political process against the majority's will."
53
The purpose behind the requirements of Takings Clause is to protect
ownership and use of land.54 If restraints on "public use" are eliminated,
or expanded by the legislature beyond the control of property owners, the
protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment will be effectively
eradicated and unjust takings will occur.55
III. Analysis
Eminent domain cases typically carry the potential for abuse.
However, this debate becomes particularly interesting post-Kelo when a
dispute arises between economic development and preservation of the
public's right to religious freedom through the use of land owned by a
religious organization.
The Kelo opinion left significant questions unanswered. These
questions include: (1) Can land owned and used for religious purposes
49. Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2675 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
51. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
52. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the
Founders cannot have intended this perverse result.").
53. Id. at 2672.
54. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
55. See Ramsey, supra note 34 ("[u]nder this very low standard, it is hard to imagine




be seized and transferred solely for private development?; and (2) Are
there any protections afforded to land used by religious organizations
solely for religious worship? Individual state legislatures must now
answer these questions. However, disagreement exists among states
regarding what exactly defines "public use," how "public use" should
specifically be tested, and what constitutes the best "public use."
Currently, states are split on the exact definition of "public use.,'
56
Some states liberally interpret57 what types of land are subject to eminent
domain; whereas, other state legislatures restrict 58 what land can be
subject to governmental takings. Thus far the Supreme Court holds that
as long as the states do not violate federal or state constitutions, they are
able to make individual determinations for their citizens.59
Thus, the question becomes how states should determine what
constitutes the "best public use." Each state's legislature must address
this exact issue through its own legislation. However, in order to ensure
that both the Federal Constitution is upheld and the citizens' inherent,
constitutional rights are protected, each state should place strict limits on
the ability of its government to condemn property owned and used by
religious organizations.
60
A. A Constitutional Tug-of-War
The Supreme Court's decision to expand the concept of "public
use" creates an inevitable battle between the First Amendment and the
Fifth Amendment when the seizure of land in dispute is owned by a
religious organization. The Bill of Rights61 ensures Americans certain
freedoms and protections. For example, the First Amendment
specifically guarantees the freedom of religion.62 Courts have vigorously
upheld this important Amendment and its privileges since its
enactment.63 This Amendment is just one of the many defining and
56. See discussion infra Part III-B.
57. See discussion infra Part III-E-(2).
58. See discussion infra Part III-E-(1).
59. See discussion infra Part III-D.
60. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment
Land Uses, 69 Mo. L. REv. 653, 654 (2004) [hereinafter Saxer].
61. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.") The First
Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 750 (1976).
63. See, e.g., Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 509 P.2d 1250, 1252
(Colo. 1973) (recognizing "the extraordinary importance of the rights and freedoms
engraved in the foundation of our country by the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights.
Of all the freedoms, freedom of worship may be the most precious to the spirit.").
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characteristic freedoms that Americans enjoy on a daily basis.
The American population is not comprised of one single religion,
but instead is a mix of many different and diverse religious groups.
Freedom to pursue or not to pursue a religion is a fundamental right
established by the Framers of the Constitution.64
Eminent domain is an important power for sovereign governments
to possess.65 Yet without strict regulations, eminent domain can also be
potentially damaging and abusive. Governments must be cautious when
invoking eminent domain powers due to the significant effect that
takings of land have on society.
State legislatures have the primary responsibility of coordinating
state eminent domain laws and consequently, they assume the duty and
obligation to protect the rights of their citizens. Accordingly, states
should seek to objectively determine what potential risks and abuses
exist during takings. In addition, states should safeguard citizens against
those risks and abuses. Legislatures need to draft standards and
requirements for governmental takings, particularly for those which
result in a subsequent transfer to a private entity.
The Kelo decision opened the door to permit governmental takings
of land, used by individuals for religious purposes, for private purposes.66
With this decision, the Supreme Court disregarded one of the most
fundamental principles in America, the freedom of religion.67 Inevitably,
challenges will arise regarding the condemnation of a religious
organization's property.
Consider the opening example. A local borough council condemns
land containing a church owned by a Protestant religious organization.
The land is currently being used solely by church parishioners for
religious worship. The right to worship 68 freely is guaranteed to these
parishioners by the First Amendment. 69 However, the council wants to
enhance economic development for the community by transferring this
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
65. See Press Release, Rep. Steve Chabot, Rep., United States Cong., Chabot Helps
Push Property Rights Legislation Through Judiciary Committee, (Oct. 28, 2005) (on file
with the States News Service) [hereinafter Chabot] ("[flew would question that the
Constitution provides a legitimate role for eminent domain when the purpose is a true
public use and the property owner receives just compensation. Properly used, eminent
domain should give communities an option of last resort to complete the development of
roads, schools, utilities and other essential public infrastructure projects.").
66. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
67. See Chabot, supra note 65.
68. See U.S. CONST. amend I. The Establishment Clause dictates that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion....
69. See id. The Free Exercise Clause states that "Congress shall make no law...
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
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tract of land to a private corporation, Wal-Mart, for future development
of its signature Supercenter Store. The council seeks to impose state
eminent domain laws to condemn the land for the transfer. In this
straightforward scenario, citizen parishioners are actively exercising their
religious freedoms, yet nothing prevents the council from taking their
land.
In fact, the Kelo decision bestows upon government entities the
power to seize land and transfer it to private developers for another
"public use.",70 This "new public use" is interpreted by the legislature to
be a "better public use." In this example, the governmental taking of
land for subsequent private use can occur because the state legislature
neglected to enact any additional protections to safeguard its parishioner
citizens. Thus, without specific provisions to state constitutions and
statutes, Kelo allows the local borough council to unjustly deem the
Supercenter Store to be of better "public use" to the community. Both
federal and state governments need to act to ensure that the rights of
citizens are protected by balancing the interests of the Fifth Amendment
against those rights afforded by the First Amendment.
B. State Interpretations of the Best "Public Use"
When the government wants to condemn religious land, the first
line of defense that the religious organization can assert is that the tract
of land in dispute is already serving a "public purpose." Land that is
used by a religious organization, strictly for religious purposes, is already
being used by the public. 71 Therefore, the religious organization will
argue there is no justification for the condemnation because the first
requirement of the Takings Clause, for "public use," is currently
satisfied.72
What occurs instead is that one public use meets another conflicting
public use. Therefore, when two competing public uses exist, states must
determine what the "better use" of the land actually is, and whether the
taking should occur. In this situation, an examination of both the state
constitution and the state eminent domain statutes determines whether
the taking is constitutional and which public use should prevail. For
example, in the recurring hypothetical the question remains the same. Is
it a "better public use" for the community to condemn a church and put
in a Wal-Mart Supercenter Store, or is it a "better public use" to reject
the condemnation and allow the parishioners to continue to freely
70. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666.
71. Although every individual might not want to use the religious organization's
land, the property is still "open" to the public.
72. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2006]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
exercise their religious beliefs?
Accordingly, what exactly the best "public use" is becomes the
debated question in communities. While the land is already being used
by a religious organization to exercise their constitutional freedoms, a
new retail store would also serve the public, but in an economic way.
73
Thus, it is up to the state legislatures to determine what the best "public
use" of the land should be.74 Laws regarding the condemnation and
taking of private property vary from state to state.75 Once a state
determines constitutional eminent domain guidelines, it is neither the
duty nor the desire of the federal government to impose further restraints
on a state's individual power.76
Unfortunately, no exact or universal definition of "public use" exists
among the states. 77 Therefore, it is up to each state to determine what
should constitute "public use," and when disputes arise, what should
constitute the legitimate "best use" of the land. What factors guide this
debate is also disputed. Is the best "public use" that which gives the state
more tax benefits? Is it the use that serves a larger percentage of the
public?
State legislatures are given considerable deference in drawing the
line between "public" and "private" use. 78 "An external, judicial check
on how the public use requirement is interpreted, however limited, is
necessary, if this constraint on government power is a judicial one. 79
Any future economic redevelopment projects on current religiously-
used land tracts should be deemed unconstitutional. Recall Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Kelo where she states that the results produced can
be absurd,8° particularly when a "purportedly 'public purpose' taking
meets the public use requirement." 8 ' For instance, "any single-family
home... might be razed to make way for an apartment building, or any
church... might be replaced with a retail store... ,82
The problem with the Court's decision in Kelo is that it does not
adequately protect against abusive decision making which could
73. See discussion infra Part III-C.
74. See J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Md.-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 792
A.2d 288, 297-98 (Md. 2002).
75. See discussion infra Part III-E.
76. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).
77. See, e.g., State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County/Kan. City,
Kan., 962 P.2d 543, 553 (Kan. 1998).
78. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446
(1930) ("[i]t is well established that.., the question [of] what is a public use is a judicial
one.").
80. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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condemn land used for religious purposes. If a state legislature enacts a
law providing that the better "public use" is the more economically
efficient use, then certainly any religious organization's place of worship
could be condemned. Churches, and other religious institutions, will
contest that their property is already devoted to a "public use" and,
therefore, that it should be exempt from condemnation. As a result of
Kelo's shortcomings, and its failure to adequately protect religiously-
used land against potential abuses, it is up to the individual states to
protect citizens.
One way to avoid determining what the best "public use" is would
be to have states exclude certain types of property. Only state
legislatures can determine what property should be exempted.83 Since
property owned and used by a religious organization is already devoted
to "public use" and facilitates individual rights to religious freedom, it
should be exempt from condemnation.
C. The Problem: Economic Agendas
The United States is a nation which is not only recognized for its
wealth, but also respected for it. Indisputably, economics play a vital
role on national and state agendas. Every day important financial
decisions are made, presumably for the improvement of the nation and
states. However, when economic agendas are involved, the lines can
become blurred when deciding what the "best public use" of land is. The
Kelo decision blurs this fine line even further.
Kelo allows states to condemn property and transfer it for private,
economic redevelopment.84 The proposed economic development plan
in the Kelo decision was built around the premise that the plan would
generate new jobs and larger tax revenues for the locality. 85 This is the
equivalent of saying that Kelo allows the government to take land if it
can increase the tax base of the property.86
Returning to the opening example, when comparing churches with
retail stores, the tax revenue factor alone could impact the decision
because there are significant economic consequences based on who owns
83. See Mt. Vemon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240
U.S. 30, 32 (1916) (stating that the legislature, in delegating authority, may except certain
property from condemnation, so long as the classification is reasonable).
84. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
85. See Todd Jackson, Private-Keep Off; Eminent Domain: Aftershocks of Kelo v.
City of New London, THE ROANOKE TIMES, July 18, 2005, at Al.
86. See Charles B. Sheppard, Eminent Domain Condemnation of Private Property
for Private Use: Legitimate or a Land Grab?, 44-SEP ORANGE COUNTY LAWY. 30, 30
(2002).
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87the property. All states authorize tax exemptions for church property,
as well as other property used solely for religious worship. Since the
institution of the federal income tax, tax exemptions have always been
provided for religious organizations.
88
In Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York,89 the Supreme
Court held the "grant of a tax exemption [was] not a sponsorship since
the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but
simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state.
90
The purpose behind this legislation was neither the advancement nor
inhibition of religion, 91 nor was it to support or sponsor, but rather to
limit the inherent dangers of the imposition of property taxes, such as
failure to pay.92 Therefore, it respected the principle of separation of
church and state because there was no correlation between tax
exemptions and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.93
Property used solely for religious worship by various religious
organizations is particularly vulnerable to seizure for the obvious reason
that any big-box retailer, such as Wal-Mart, would pay property taxes,
thereby, significantly increasing the tax base of the property. This
possibility becomes particularly threatening to churches in areas that are
thoroughly developed and do not possess available open space for new
development. Here, land used for religious worship could easily be
displaced for the construction of new stores.
Kelo stands for the proposition that economic enhancement, through
private redevelopment, is "public use." This makes any property
susceptible to taking, but particularly property used solely for religious
purposes because it is tax-exempt. Thus, enlarging a community's tax
base can now be seen as a constitutional "public use."
The tragedy of the Kelo decision is that the Supreme Court has
construed the concept of "public use" differently from its original and
intended use.94 The Framers of the Constitution sought to protect against
87. See Walz v. Tax Comm. of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970)
(noting that "all [fifty] states provide for tax exemption of places of worship, most of
them doing so by constitutional guarantees.").
88. See id.
89. Id. at 664 (finding no violation of the First Amendment religious clauses in state
taxation schemes which exempt property used solely for religious worship).
90. Id. at 675.
91. Seeid.at672.
92. See id. at 704.
93. See Walz v. Tax Comm. of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970). See also
id. at 676 (explaining that "the exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement
between church and state far less than taxation of churches. It restricts the fiscal
relationship between church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired
separation insulating each from the other.").
94. See Ramsey, supra note 34:
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these specific abuses.95 Specifically, the Framers sought to prevent the
seizure of land to increase the tax base. 96 Takings of religiously-used
lands for economic redevelopment projects are abusive and need to be
halted.
D. A Trend Leading to Abuse: Prior Supreme Court Rulings
Historically, courts took a restrictive view of the power of eminent
domain because it encroaches on the right to acquire and possess
property. Progressively, however, this view changed.97  Instead of
serving a governmental purpose for a road, park or common carrier, the
Supreme Court increasingly expanded its interpretation of the words
"public use" 98 to now mean for "any public purpose." 99 In Kelo, the
Court relied on two prior holdings to determine whether Connecticut's
attempt to condemn the petitioners' houses satisfied the "public use"
requirement of the Takings Clause. The two cases the Court relied upon
were Berman v. Parker10 0 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 10 1
In Berman, the Supreme Court approved a redevelopment plan that
specifically targeted a blighted area.10 2 Berman held that because the
disputed property was in a blighted area, the legislature should be able to
determine the best "public use," and the Fifth Amendment should not
impede the legislature's determination of what constitutes the "best"
decision. 103
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court revisited this holding and
Most obviously, [public use] refers to situations in which the property will be
used by the government itself to fulfill one of the traditional public functions of
government, such as providing a park or highway. Additionally, it may refer to
situations in which the property will be operated by a "common carrier," such
as a railroad, with an obligation to serve the public. It emphatically did not
include situations in which the government transferred property from one
private owner to another. Under no possible meaning of the phrase could that




97. See Restricting Government Use of Eminent Domain: Capitol Hill Hearing
Before the H. Resources Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement by Bert Gall, Attorney,
Institute for Justice) [hereinafter Gall].
98. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2263 (2005) ("[w]ithout
exception, our cases have defined [the concept of valid public purpose] broadly,
reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.").
99. See Gall, supra note 97 ("[t]he Court ruled [in Berman] that the removal of
blight was a public 'purpose,' despite the fact that the word 'purpose' appears nowhere in
the text of the Constitution .... ).
100. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
101. Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
102. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663 (see generally Berman, 348 U.S. 26).
103. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33
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reaffirmed the Berman decision in Midkiff 10 4  In Midkiff the Court
approved a land condemnation scheme to seize property to break up an
oligopoly because the legislature determined the taking was a legitimate
benefit to the public.1 °5 Midkiff held that legislatures should be given
deference 10 6 when deciding whether to condemn land under the Takings
Clause. Ironically, however, the Court also noted that "[a] purely private
taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it
would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be
void."'
10 7
Today, the scope of what constitutes "public use" is dangerously
broad, and religious rights are at risk because the Kelo majority did not
refrain10 8 from increasing the scope of this definition.'0 9 Instead, the
majority paved its notion of a general "public purpose" path once
again. 0 In dissent, Justice O'Connor stated:
In moving away from our decisions sanctioning the condemnation of
harmful property use, the Court today significantly expands the
meaning of public use. It holds that a sovereign may take private
property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for
new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to
generate some secondary benefit for the public-such as increased
104. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229.
105. See id. at 245.
106. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (2005) (citing Midkiff
467 U.S. at 244).
107. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
108. See Ramsey, supra note 34:
The Kelo Court did not pretend to base its conclusion upon the words and
historical understanding of the Constitution. Instead, it effectively admitted
that it was re-writing the key phrase in the Fifth Amendment to produce what it
thought was a better outcome. According to the Court, modem needs required
it to substitute the phrase "public purpose" for the Constitution's phrase "public
use." This would allow the government to seize private land and transfer it to
other private parties any time that such transfer would facilitate "economic
development," even though neither the government nor the public would end
up owing or using the land.
109. See Gall, supra note 97 ("By effectively changing the wording of the Fifth
Amendment, the Court opened Pandora's Box, and now properties are routinely taken
pursuant to development statutes when there's absolutely nothing wrong with them,
except that some well-heeled developer covets them and the government hopes to
increase its tax revenue.").
110. See Ramsey, supra note 34:
The Kelo decision is an attack, not only upon private property rights, but upon
the whole idea of constitutional rights. If a right written into the text of the
Constitution can be altered by five members of the Supreme Court simply
because they believe that the evolving modem needs of government require it
to give away, then we have no fixed rights, but only those rights the Court is
willing to accept at any given time.
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tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure.II
Justice O'Connor rightfully argues that the majority's holding should
have been narrower, because now there are no limits on the words "for
public use" and no limitations on the reach of eminent domain.' 
12
E. A Trend Leading to Protection: State Deference
States retain the power to determine what property should be subject
to governmental takings.11 3  The problem with allocating states this
power is that the factors determining which land can be taken vary
drastically from state to state. Specifically there is variation regarding
the use of religious lands and subsequent transfers for economic
advancements. However, First Amendment rights do not vary by state
and are enjoyed equally by every American citizen.
1 14
Therefore, states should consider one or more of the following
factors when the land in question is used for religious purposes:
(1) Whether moving to a new location will disrupt the operations of the
religious organization; (2) Whether the property in question is vital to the
organization's continuing existence; (3) Whether there is any symbolic
or historical significance to the property; (4) Whether compensation for
the displacement of the religious organization is adequate; and (5) What
public benefits will occur as a result of the transfer?
A potential for increased abuse regarding the condemnation of
religiously-used lands occurs because the Kelo majority does not set any
limits regarding state eminent domain power. Instead, Kelo expands the
concept of "public use."' 15 Therefore, it is imperative that states enact
legislation to protect these religiously-used lands from abusive,
economic redevelopment plans. Ultimately, it is their responsibility to
protect their citizens' First Amendment rights and to preserve the use of
these lands. Some states have initiated their legislative processes to
ensure protections against condemnation for economic development
exist.
1 16
111. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2675 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
112. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is extended by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 750 (1976).
114. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
115. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005).
116. See Rich Ehisen, Changes Imminent for Eminent Domain, State Net Capitol J.,
volume XIII, No. 25, July 18, 2005 [hereinafter Ehisen]:
Texas became the first state since the decision to actually move legislation
when the House unanimously approved [House Joint Resolution] 19, a
constitutional amendment that would bar land seizure like that in New
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1. The Conservative (and More Desirable) Approach
Several states already have measures to prevent governmental
takings for strictly economic advancements' 1 7  in non-blighted
communities. For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan recently
affirmed that the state's condemning power" 8 for public purposes and
uses specifically means "for the use or benefit of the public."" 9  In
County of Wayne v. Hathcock,120 the court held that the condemnation of
property for a later transfer to a private entity will be permitted only
when the public retains a measure of control over the property,' 2' or
when the area in question is blighted and the transfer is necessary for
redevelopment. 1
22
In Michigan, "public use" does not include the taking of property
for a subsequent transfer which leads to the construction of businesses
owned by private entities. 23 Thus, transfers to private entities that are
not subject to public oversight are unconstitutional under state law. 1
24
This recent decision overruled Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
Detroit, 125 which had allowed governmental takings for private economic
development projects.1 6  Poletown authorized the condemnation of
approximately 1100 homes, twenty stores, and two churches for the
construction of a General Motors manufacturing plant and an increase in
the city's tax base.' 27 Michigan's approach now ensures protections and
safeguards from unconstitutional governmental takings to strictly raise a
tax base. It acknowledges the principle of private property and respects
the right to private property.
Other states adopted tests to analyze each situation on a case-by-
London.... Several other states-California, Tennessee, Delaware, Florida,
Minnesota, and New Jersey among others-have introduced their own eminent
domain bills. Several more, including Georgia, Missouri, Alabama, Idaho,
New Hampshire, Oklahoma and Virginia are considering similar bills.
117. See id. ("At least eight states, including Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky and Maine,
already bar using eminent domain as an economic development tool ... ").
118. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.23 (West 1998); see also Mich. CONST. art.
X, § 2 (1963).
119. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 778 (Mich. 2004).
120. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 765, overruling Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
121. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782.
122. Seeid. at 783.
123. See id. at 784.
124. See id.
125. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
126. See id. at 458.
127. See Katherine M. McFarland, Privacy and Property: Two Sides of the Same
Coin: The Mandate For Stricter Scrutiny For Government Uses of Eminent Domain, 14
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 142, 149 (2004).
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case basis. For example, Colorado adopted a balancing test, established
in Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority,128 to balance a
governmental taking against a citizen's First Amendment rights. 129 This
test weighs the competing interests of the state against those of the
religious organization when deciding if an infringement on one's
individual First Amendment rights occurred. 1
30
In Pillar of Fire, the Denver Urban Renewal Authority (DURA)
sought to condemn a tract of land which included the Pillar of Fire
Church. 13  The Supreme Court of Colorado eventually authorized
renewal by DURA 132 because the area in question was so blighted and
deteriorated that the entire tract had to be condemned in order to
redevelop the land for the public's benefit. 133  Additionally, no
alternative means existed to successfully complete the renewal project.
34
Colorado allows for condemnation of religiously-used properties in
blighted areas, but only after a hearing to ensure that there is a substantial
public interest in the redevelopment project and that no other reasonable
means are available to accomplish the project. 135 In Colorado, the state's
interests in implementing urban renewal plans are balanced against
citizens' constitutional rights of the First Amendment.
136
The balancing test established in Pillar of Fire was upheld in the
Order of Friars Minor of the Province of the Most Holy Name v. Denver
Urban Renewal Authority.'37  In that case, the Supreme Court of
Colorado maintained that courts look at the dispute and then balance the
interests involved to determine if the state demonstrated a substantial
interest with no reasonable alternatives and finally decide if the state can
permissibly and constitutionally seize the religiously-used property.
38
The area planned for renewal must be evaluated as a whole to determine
whether the religiously-used land situated on that tract is vital to the
"overall renewal plan" and is subject to seizure under the state laws and
the Constitution. 1
39
This conservative view upholds the Framer's intent and
128. Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 509 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1973).
129. See id. at 1253.
130. Id. at 1254.
131. See id. at 1250.
132. See Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 522 P.2d 23, 25 (Colo. 1976).
133. See id. at 24.
134. Id. at 25.
135. See Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 509 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Colo.
1973).
136. See id. at 1235.
137. Order of Friars Minor of the Province of the Most Holy Name v. Denver Urban
Renewal Auth., 527 P.2d 804 (Colo. 1974).
138. Seeid. at 804-05.
139. Seeid. at 805.
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fundamental understanding of eminent domain power. The conservative
states' perspective to preserve property rights unless there is a
governmental necessity to take the land is the more desirable and
protective approach.
2. The Liberal (and Less Desirable) Approach
Unfortunately, not all states ensure these protections. 140 Minnesota
and Maryland are examples of states that take an expansive and abusive
interpretation to the constitutional requirement for "public use."' 14 1 These
states do not afford protections to religiously-used lands and their
detrimental interpretation of "public use" revolves around their economic
agendas.
Minnesota's state constitution authorizes the power of eminent
domain. It states "[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed or
damaged for public use without just compensation therefor, first paid or
secured."'142 However, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has held that
when a dispute arises regarding eminent domain condemnations, "[g]reat
weight must be given to the determination of the condemning authority,
and the scope of review is narrowly limited. If it appears that the record
contains some evidence, however informal, that the taking serves a
public purpose, there is nothing left for the courts to pass upon."
143
Minnesota takes the view that courts should not interfere with a
condemning authority's actions unless they are contrary to law.
14 4
This liberal approach was upheld by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in City of Duluth v. State of Minnesota. 14 In City of Duluth,
the court authorized the condemnation of land in order to construct a
paper mill which was expected to revitalize the local economy. 146 The
court held that the concept of public use should be construed broadly
47
and that the words "public use" are interchangeable with the words
"public purpose."' 14 8 As such, the proposed construction of the private
140. See Ehisen, supra note 116 (noting that "[flive states-Kansas, Maryland,
Minnesota, New York and North Dakota-currently allow for eminent domain authority
to be used for private economic development.").
141. See, e.g., Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. v. Minneapolis Metro. Co., 104 N.W.2d
864 (Minn. 1960); see also, e.g., Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc.,
339 A.2d 278 (Md. 1975).
142. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (2005).
143. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. v. Minneapolis Metro. Co., 104 N.W.2d 864, 874
(Minn. 1960).
144. See id. at 873-74.
145. City of Duluth v. State of Minn., 390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986).
146. See id. at 760.




entity fulfilled a "public purpose" because it contributed to the city's tax
base and created more job opportunities for the area. 1
49
The State of Maryland also allows for the condemnation of private
property and the subsequent transfer to another private entity based on
the justification that resulting economic benefits are "public" in nature.1 50
In Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc.,' 5 1 the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held that condemnation of land for the
construction of an industrial park satisfied the "public use"
requirement.1 52 The court determined that the "new job opportunities
and new tax ratables"' 53 created were the beneficial effect upon the
public. That court endorsed the proposition that public use is not
synonymous with the public's literal or physical use of the property, or
that the government must use the condemned property. 54 Instead, what
Maryland and Minnesota courts are doing is holding that if certain
members of the public use the land and it increases the tax base, then the
land justifies a "public use." This, however, completely disregards the
Framers' intent.
Maryland and Minnesota's eminent domain laws do not adequately
protect citizens' constitutional rights to the First Amendment. Instead,
they provide more protection to private developers. As a result, there are
essentially no limits on governmental takings so long as a future
economic benefit can be anticipated. Economic benefits from retail
stores and private development companies are undoubtedly larger than
those created by residences and tax-exempt properties. In this situation,
citizens should not only fear losing their houses, but also their
churches. 55 The First and Fifth Amendments must be given equal
weight, not disproportionate weight.
F. The Future- What Kelo Actually Means
Justice O'Connor concluded her dissent by predicting the potential
abuses that will occur when the government condemns land and transfers
that land to private entities for development.1 56 After Kelo, religious
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 339 A.2d 278 (Md.
1975).
152. Seeid. at 289.
153. Id. at 281-82.
154. See id. at 284.
155. See Ralph Blumenthal, Humble Church Is at Center of Debate on Eminent
Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at All [hereinafter Blumenthal] ("It's not just
grandma's house we have to worry about. .. [n]ow it's God's house, too."),
156. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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organizations fear that their tax-exempt status is no longer a benefit, but
instead makes them a prime target 157 for governmental takings. The
American Center for Law and Justice warns that "[i]f the government
decides a mall would produce more tax income than your home or
church, they can now take your home or church."'
' 58
Recently, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, the frightening vulnerability imposed
by the Kelo decision has now become a reality. 159 But instead of a Wal-
Mart, it is a Home Depot.' 60 With legislation on the table,'16 but not yet
enacted, the parishioners of the Centennial Baptist Church are seeing the
inadequacy of their state's eminent domain laws. 62 City officials are
trying to negotiate a deal with the church before it invokes its eminent
domain powers to acquire the land on which the church sits.
163
Currently, the church insists on "staying put" and has rejected all
offers. 1
64
If the city cannot reach a deal, it appears that the state's eminent
domain laws-like Connecticut's, which allow for economic
development and private transfers-will most likely be invoked. 65 To
date, the city has claimed fourteen properties by eminent domain laws;
however, seizure of the land that Centennial Baptist Church currently
occupies has not been authorized. 66 A local newspaper is calling this "a
battle between God Almighty and the almighty dollar.'
167
Tulsa officials are trying to implement a shopping center with stores
to foster economic development and to increase the tax base. 68  The
mayor has recently stated, "I'm open to anyone telling me how we're
going to pay for city services."' 169  Building new stores and
157. See Ehisen, supra note 116.
158. See id.
159. See Blumenthal, supra note 155.
160. See id.
161. See id.
Strengthened by a United States Supreme Court ruling last summer that
approved the condemnation of private property by New London, Conn., for
resale to other private interest for what the court [sic] called "public purpose,"
municipalities around the country are considering similar forced takings, to a
chorus of opposition by local interests and state legislators. Bills to block such
seizures are on the docket in Oklahoma and many other states....
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. See Manny Gamallo, Church Not Included in Condemnation Effort, TULSA
WORLD, May 16, 2006 [hereinafter Gamallo]. See also Michael Smith, The Powers That
Be: A Multimillion-Dollar Sand Springs Development Squares OffAgainst a Church That
Refuses to Leave Its Sanctuary, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 4, 2006.
165. See Blumenthal, supra note 155.
166. See Gamallo, supra note 164.





unsympathetically evicting private land owners is hardly the answer.
Unfortunately, it appears that this situation is just the beginning; Kelo
opened the floodgates170 on this once "privileged" power.
IV. Conclusion
Justice O'Connor's dissent accurately foreshadowed the danger
American citizens now face as a result of the Kelo decision. The
fundamental right to free exercise of religious worship should not be
replaced by the Supreme Court's decision. States should act quickly to
protect property rights from the expanding and manipulative definition of
"public use" that the Supreme Court recently created. The term "public
use" must limit governmental takings, ensuring that takings are
constitutional, and not abusive. Churches should be replaced by new
churches, not Wal-Marts.
Although the Supreme Court may have inadvertently left states with
this potential abuse of power, it is ultimately the states' burden to make
sure that the rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment and the First
Amendment are still upheld. State legislatures and courts should be
mindful that the Framers sought to seek limits with the Constitution and
placed two specific requirements on the Takings Clause. Therefore,
states should not continue to expand the concept of "public use."
Instead, states should ensure that "public use" is not manipulated into an
improper concept.
The repercussions of what will now constitute "public use" post-
Kelo will be interesting. The extent to which state legislatures will
condemn religiously-used lands will be seen only with time. History has
shown a tradition of judicial restraint by courts to condemn religious
property. Let's hope this continues. Have the words "for public use" in
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment become a nullity? Let's
hope not.
170. See Gall, supra note 97 ("In response to [Kelo], there has been an outpouring of
public outcry against this closely divided decision. Overwhelming majorities in every
major poll taken after the Kelo decision have condemned this result.").
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